By Adem Kılıç, Political Scientist
In the latest elections held in Israel, Netanyahu’s political bloc secured 53 seats in the 120-member Knesset, while the opposition led by Eisenkot won 48 seats. The 19 seats won by Arab parties gave them a potentially decisive influence over the formation of the next government.
Following the elections, Eisenkot was assigned the task of forming a government, a development that could be considered significant in terms of bringing the Netanyahu era to an end. However, being given this mandate does not guarantee that Eisenkot will succeed in forming a government or that Netanyahu will disappear from the political scene altogether.
The biggest challenge facing Eisenkot is securing the parliamentary majority required to form a government. To achieve this, he needs the support of Arab lawmakers.
Such support could take the form of direct participation in a coalition or external backing for the government. The latter arrangement is known as a “minority government.”
Indeed, similar forms of cooperation have taken place in Israeli politics before. However, cooperation with Arab parties faces serious political opposition from a significant section of Israel’s Jewish political parties.
For this reason, Netanyahu will seek to use his parliamentary connections to persuade certain opposition lawmakers to switch sides, explore alternative coalition arrangements or exploit potential disagreements within Eisenkot’s camp over cooperation with Arab legislators.
What the post-Netanyahu era really means
A change of government in Israel will disappoint those expecting a shift in the country’s foreign policy and occupation strategy.
This is because Netanyahu’s foreign policy relationships, particularly with the United States, his deeply polarizing domestic political approach and his occupation strategy, especially in Gaza, are positions that former Israeli Chief of General Staff Eisenkot also supports to a considerable extent.
In other words, Eisenkot, who is associated with numerous Israeli massacres and is known as the “architect of the Dahiya Doctrine,” has a security outlook and an approach centered on the use of military force that differ very little from Netanyahu’s.
Eisenkot’s position on preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state, the strategy of expanding so-called settlements in occupied territories and the humanitarian devastation in Gaza is almost identical to Netanyahu’s.
This is the fundamental point that must not be overlooked when assessing the political struggle for power in Israel.
In other words, Netanyahu’s departure and the termination of the security and occupation policies that deepened during his tenure are two entirely different matters.
The occupation strategy stretching from Gaza to Lebanon will not change
Israel’s occupation strategy in recent years cannot be explained solely by Netanyahu’s personal political preferences.
The destruction inflicted on Gaza, the expansion of the occupation across Palestinian territories, so-called settlement activities in the West Bank and cross-border attacks against countries in the region should be viewed as components of Israel’s alleged broader “security doctrine” and so-called “state policy.”
For this reason, ending these activities, which have been characterized as genocide in international forums, particularly before the International Court of Justice, and have become the subject of judicial proceedings, will not be possible simply by replacing the prime minister.
Moreover, Israel’s occupation activities are not limited to Gaza.
Israel, which does not want a strong central authority in Syria and instead seeks “small and manageable neighbors,” will not abandon its occupation of the Golan Heights, where it has also been recognized as an occupying power by the United Nations. Nor will it give up its occupation in Lebanon, pursued under the pretext of establishing a so-called security zone extending as far as the Litani River.
Therefore, it would be unrealistic to assume that Israel’s policies towards Gaza, Syria and Lebanon will change under an Eisenkot-led government.
The new government may change the timing of military attacks, its diplomatic rhetoric or the messages it delivers to international public opinion. However, it will not change its approach to using military power as an instrument of occupation and regional influence.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the end of the Netanyahu era in Israel cannot be regarded as the beginning of a new chapter in the Palestinian question or the security balance in the Middle East.
Even if Eisenkot succeeds in forming a government, he will seek to preserve Israel’s existing military presence, stretching from Gaza to Syria and from Lebanon to the West Bank, by treating these positions as strategic “gains.” He will also seek to maintain Israel’s presence in the occupied territories.
At the same time, however, he will attempt to construct a narrative that attributes all these crimes exclusively to Netanyahu.
The responsibility of the international community, therefore, will be to prevent the occupation crimes and genocide committed by Israel from being portrayed as the sole responsibility of Netanyahu, and to continue emphasizing that the State of Israel itself is the principal perpetrator.