Is the confrontation around Bab al-Mandeb fundamentally a Yemeni civil war, a Saudi-Yemeni conflict, or a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia? The answer is increasingly all three, but none alone explains the stakes. What began as a struggle over power and territory in Yemen has become a test of regional security, freedom of navigation and the emerging balance of power in the Middle East.
The latest escalation has forced this question back to the forefront. The Houthis are fighting Yemen’s internationally recognized government and Saudi-backed forces, while their attacks on Saudi territory and strategic infrastructure have brought the kingdom into a renewed confrontation. Iran’s military support adds a regional dimension, but the Houthis retain their own political objectives and calculations. Treating the conflict exclusively as a Saudi-Iranian proxy war risks overlooking the internal Yemeni struggle that sustains it.
When Hormuz Casts a Shadow
The crisis around the Bab al-Mandeb Strait has entered a far more dangerous phase. What was once primarily a maritime-security problem has become part of a wider strategic equation linking Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United States and the global energy system.
The Houthi advance along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, including the seizure of Mokha and the strategically located Perim Island, has altered the geography of the conflict. The movement now has a stronger position from which to threaten or influence traffic through one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. And the timing could hardly be more consequential.
The Strait of Hormuz is already at the center of a confrontation involving Iran, the United States and Israel. With traffic through Hormuz severely disrupted, Bab al-Mandeb has acquired an importance extending far beyond Yemen itself. Two maritime chokepoints, at opposite ends of the Arabian Peninsula, are now caught in the same strategic storm.
This creates the central dilemma: can the Bab al-Mandeb crisis still be contained through diplomacy, or is the region moving toward another war in which maritime security becomes the trigger?
The temptation in Washington and some regional capitals is to see the Houthis primarily through the Iranian lens. There is substantial evidence for Iran’s military support. The American Council on Foreign Relations says Iranian assistance has significantly strengthened the Houthis’ military capabilities, including their ability to project power into the Red Sea. Yet the same assessment notes that the Houthis are better understood as an Iranian “informal partner” than as a conventional proxy.
That distinction is crucial.
The Houthis have their own history, leadership, financial networks and political calculations. Their roots lie in Yemen’s internal struggles and the revival of Zaydi political identity, long before their relationship with Tehran became strategically important. Iran has helped expand their military capabilities, but that does not mean that every Houthi decision originates in Tehran.
Sources familiar with the region increasingly point to the same complication: Iranian support and Houthi autonomy can exist at the same time.
This matters because the wrong diagnosis can produce the wrong policy.
If the Houthis were simply an Iranian instrument, pressure on Tehran should translate into pressure on Sana’a. Yet the history of Yemen offers little evidence for such a straightforward chain of command. The Saudi-Iranian rapprochement of 2023 did not eliminate the Houthi threat to Red Sea shipping. Conversely, the UN-brokered truce of 2022 demonstrated that direct engagement with the Yemeni parties could reduce violence.
Brookings scholar Allison Minor has argued that describing the Houthis as an Iranian proxy can fundamentally distort the threat assessment because Iran does not exercise sufficient control over Houthi behavior. The movement has repeatedly demonstrated that it can pursue its own interests, even while benefiting substantially from Iranian support.
The distinction becomes even more important as the Houthis consolidate their position around Bab al-Mandeb.
The seizure of Perim Island places the movement close to the center of a maritime chokepoint through which a significant share of global trade and energy once passed. Their advance also comes as the Red Sea is already suffering from years of shipping disruption. The International Maritime Organization continues to monitor attacks on commercial vessels and has repeatedly called for the protection of seafarers, ships and cargoes.
For Saudi Arabia, this is not simply another chapter in the Yemen war
Bab al-Mandeb is becoming part of the kingdom’s wider energy-security equation precisely as Hormuz becomes more uncertain. Saudi oil exports depend on alternative routes to the Gulf, and the Red Sea has consequently acquired greater strategic value. Recent Houthi attacks and territorial gains have therefore created a direct challenge to Saudi economic security as well as its national security.
The reported drone incident near Mecca adds another dangerous dimension. Saudi Arabia said it intercepted a drone south of Mecca and described the security of the holy sites as a red line, while the Houthis denied responsibility. Whatever the final attribution, an incident involving Mecca carries consequences far beyond the battlefield. It risks transforming a territorial and maritime confrontation into a religiously charged crisis that would be much harder to contain.
Egypt is watching this development with particular concern
For Cairo, the Red Sea is both a national-security issue and an international maritime artery. Egypt has publicly reaffirmed its solidarity with Saudi Arabia, condemned attacks threatening civilian facilities and navigation, and emphasized the protection of freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and international waterways.
At the same time, Egypt has strong reasons to favor diplomacy over another open-ended military confrontation. Cairo appears to prefer quiet and indirect channels capable of containing the Houthi escalation without granting the movement political recognition or legitimizing its control over the Red Sea coast. That approach reflects a broader Egyptian calculation: protect Saudi security and freedom of navigation while avoiding a wider war that could further destabilize Yemen and the Red Sea.
For Washington, the dilemma is even more complicated
The United States must protect international shipping and support its Saudi partner while avoiding another military commitment that could widen the regional war. The recent US-Houthi contacts in Muscat are revealing in this regard. Reuters reported that American officials held a confidential meeting with Houthi representatives in Oman, with Omani mediation playing a role. The talks reportedly focused on maritime security and limiting attacks.
The significance of such contacts goes beyond the immediate negotiations. They demonstrate that even Washington, despite its designation of the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization, recognizes that military pressure alone cannot resolve the problem.
That is the central paradox
The Houthis are simultaneously a military threat, a Yemeni political actor, an Iranian partner and an autonomous movement. Ignoring any one of these dimensions produces an incomplete picture.
The same applies to the war with Iran. Even if Washington and Tehran eventually reach an understanding over Hormuz, there is no automatic guarantee that the Houthis would abandon their position in Bab al-Mandeb. Their interests overlap with Iran’s, but they are not identical.
This is why the Bab al-Mandeb problem cannot be solved solely in Tehran
A sustainable strategy would require three parallel tracks.
The first is maritime containment: protecting commercial shipping and freedom of navigation while avoiding military actions that automatically expand the conflict.
The second is regional diplomacy: using Oman, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other regional actors to maintain channels with the Houthis and prevent miscalculation. Oman’s continuing mediation demonstrates that communication remains possible even amid military escalation.
The third—and ultimately decisive—track is Yemen itself.
No maritime coalition can permanently stabilize Bab al-Mandeb while Yemen remains politically fragmented and armed factions compete for territory, resources and legitimacy. Maritime security and a Yemeni political settlement therefore cannot be separated indefinitely.
The danger is that Bab al-Mandeb and Hormuz are treated as two separate crises when, strategically, they are increasingly connected.
Hormuz demonstrates how a state can disrupt energy flows through control of geography. Bab al-Mandeb demonstrates how a non-state actor can acquire a similar capacity. Together, they reveal a broader transformation in Middle Eastern geopolitics: control over critical geography is no longer the exclusive privilege of states.
That is the real Bab al-Mandeb dilemma
A military response may become unavoidable if commercial shipping, Saudi territory or the security of the region comes under sustained attack. But military escalation should not be confused with a political solution. The more deeply the Houthis become embedded in Yemen’s political and economic landscape, the less plausible it becomes to imagine that they can simply be bombed out of existence.
The more durable answer may therefore lie not in choosing between “Iran” and “the Houthis” as competing explanations, but in recognizing both realities simultaneously.
Iranian support gives the Houthis greater reach. Their Yemeni roots give them greater autonomy. And the combination is precisely what makes Bab al-Mandeb so difficult to solve.
The immediate task is to prevent the strait from becoming another battlefield in the Iran war. The longer-term task is to ensure that diplomacy does not merely pause the next attack, but becomes part of a wider settlement of Yemen’s unresolved conflict.
Otherwise, the shadow of Hormuz may continue to fall across Bab al-Mandeb—and turn one maritime dilemma into a much larger regional war.
Egypt’s support for Saudi Arabia
For this reason Egypt’s decision to rush to support Saudi Arabia marks a significant development. On October 18, Cairo declared its readiness to provide all necessary and possible support to defend the kingdom’s security and stability, while also emphasizing diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the crisis. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s request for parliamentary authorization for potential defensive assistance underscores the seriousness with which Egypt views the threat.
For Egypt, the stakes extend beyond solidarity with a strategic Arab partner. Bab al-Mandeb is connected to the security of the Red Sea, the Suez Canal and international trade. A prolonged confrontation threatens maritime traffic, energy supplies and Egypt’s economic interests.
Yet supporting Saudi Arabia does not necessarily mean endorsing an unlimited military campaign in Yemen. Cairo has reasons to combine defensive cooperation with diplomatic efforts, including discreet channels that might contain Houthi escalation without granting the movement political recognition. The objective would be to protect Saudi territory and freedom of navigation while preventing a regional conflict from becoming a prolonged war with unpredictable consequences.
Three conflicts in one
The first challenge is distinguishing the conflict’s three interconnected dimensions.
At the Yemeni level, the Houthis are competing for power, territory, resources and political legitimacy. A military campaign against them cannot resolve these underlying disputes by itself.
At the Saudi level, attacks on airports, energy infrastructure and border areas have transformed the confrontation into a direct national-security challenge. Riyadh cannot indefinitely accept threats to its territory or the maritime routes essential to its economic interests.
At the regional level, Iran’s support for the Houthis gives Tehran additional leverage over Saudi Arabia and international shipping. However, Iranian influence should not be confused with complete operational control. Even an agreement between Riyadh and Tehran would not necessarily settle the Houthis’ disputes with their Yemeni rivals or end their strategic ambitions.
The danger is that these three conflicts merge into a single confrontation, leaving diplomacy increasingly difficult and military escalation more costly.
Scenario One: A wider regional war
The first possibility is further escalation. Saudi Arabia could intensify military operations, while Egypt could provide defensive assistance and other regional partners could strengthen maritime security. The Houthis, in turn, might expand attacks against Saudi infrastructure and shipping, potentially drawing Iran more directly into the confrontation.
Such a trajectory would expose the limits of military power. Airstrikes might damage Houthi capabilities, but they would not necessarily eliminate the movement or resolve Yemen’s political fragmentation. The consequences could extend from the Red Sea to the Gulf, disrupting energy markets and international trade.
The danger is especially acute because Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb are strategically connected. A conflict that threatens both routes would impose costs far beyond the immediate parties. Washington would face renewed pressure to protect shipping, even as a larger intervention risked expanding the war it might seek to contain.
Scenario Two: An unexpected Saudi-Iranian opening
A second possibility is more surprising: the Bab al-Mandeb crisis could eventually encourage renewed Saudi-Iranian diplomacy rather than make confrontation inevitable.
Both countries have reasons to avoid an uncontrolled regional war. Saudi Arabia needs secure maritime routes and economic stability, while Iran has an interest in avoiding a broader coalition against it. If the costs of escalation become sufficiently high, both could find incentives to reopen communication.
Such an opening would require more than general assurances. It would need credible steps to reduce attacks, address weapons transfers and establish verifiable arrangements protecting maritime navigation. Tehran would also have to demonstrate that its diplomacy can contribute to de-escalation, even if it cannot simply command the Houthis to comply.
The central obstacle is the gap between Iranian influence and Houthi autonomy. A Saudi-Iranian understanding might reduce regional tensions without ending the Yemeni conflict. Nevertheless, even limited cooperation could create space for separate negotiations with the parties inside Yemen.
In this scenario, the crisis would produce an unexpected result: a threat to regional stability could become an incentive to reconsider relations between Iran and the Gulf states.
Scenario Three: The quadrilateral passes its first major test
The third possibility concerns the emerging cooperation among Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan. The four countries have already established a consultative framework, holding meetings in Cairo and New York and affirming the importance of coordination, diplomacy and regional stability. Egyptian President el-Sisi has advocated developing the mechanism into a more effective institutional framework for addressing regional crises.
The Bab al-Mandeb crisis could provide the first major test of whether this cooperation can move beyond consultations.
The four countries do not have identical priorities, military capabilities or relationships with Iran. Their value, however, may lie precisely in their ability to combine different diplomatic and security assets. Egypt brings direct interests in the Red Sea and Suez Canal; Saudi Arabia faces the immediate security threat; Türkiye has regional diplomatic and military weight; and Pakistan can contribute additional diplomatic channels and strategic influence.
If they coordinate defensive measures, support freedom of navigation and pursue a political settlement in Yemen, they could demonstrate that regional powers can respond collectively without depending entirely on Washington.
Success might also encourage the framework to expand its agenda, deepen institutional cooperation and eventually involve other states willing to support agreed principles of sovereignty, maritime security and non-interference.
But this outcome is not guaranteed. The four countries would need to reconcile differences over Iran, avoid turning the mechanism into an anti-Iranian alliance and distinguish collective security from participation in an open-ended war.
From crisis to regional order
These scenarios are not mutually exclusive. Military escalation could precede negotiations, while quadrilateral cooperation could help create the conditions for a Saudi-Iranian understanding. The decisive question is whether the parties treat Bab al-Mandeb as a battlefield to be won or a shared strategic vulnerability that must be managed.
The crisis has exposed the limitations of viewing Yemen solely through the lens of Iranian influence. It has also demonstrated the costs of leaving regional security dependent on external powers whose priorities may change.
Egypt’s support for Saudi Arabia could therefore have two complementary dimensions: a clear commitment to the kingdom’s security and an equally determined effort to prevent the confrontation from expanding.
Ultimately, the Bab al-Mandeb dilemma is about more than the control of a maritime chokepoint. It is a test of whether the Middle East can move from overlapping proxy conflicts toward a regional security framework capable of containing them.
The outcome will depend not only on military capabilities, but on whether regional powers can turn their shared exposure to danger into a basis for cooperation.